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Abstract As concrete dams age, the need for
remedial grouting to reduce the seepage and uplift
pressure in the rock foundations under them increases.
Based on a case study of a Swedish dam with very low
calculated safety against sliding, this paper discusses
the application of the observational method (as defined
in Eurocode 7) to manage safety aspects during
remedial grouting. The studied case was complex in
that grouting works posed the risk of causing increased
uplift pressure, which could have induced sliding
failure along a shallow, persistent, horizontal rock
joint in the foundation. The approach applied in the
studied case mainly followed the principles of the
observational method, except in some highly signif-
icant safety aspects for which alternative procedures
are suggested and discussed. Implementing these
procedures along with the observational method offers
a coherent framework to manage the safety aspects of
the remedial grouting of concrete dam foundations
that is in line with modern risk-informed dam safety
policies.
Keywords Observational method  Eurocode 7 
Dam safety  Foundation  Grouting
1 Introduction
An increasing number of dams worldwide are in
need of repair and stability-enhancing modifications
to satisfy safety regulations. For concrete dams
founded on rock, an important safety measure to
prevent dam failure by sliding or overturning is to
reduce the uplift pressure in the foundation. The
uplift pressure can be reduced by constructing a
grout curtain or by providing drainage. Today, both
methods are employed as a standard practice and are
generally considered to complement each other (US
Army Corps of Engineers 1984; International Com-
mission on Large Dams 1993; Ruggeri 2004;
Bernstone et al. 2009).
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The reducing effect of drains and grout curtains on
the uplift pressure may not be permanent. With time,
the grout curtain may deteriorate and the installed
drains may become clogged (Ruggeri 2004; Fell et al.
2005), which can have a serious impact on dam safety
(Spross et al. 2014a). The stability of dams against
sliding and overturning can be improved by measures
such as increasing the drainage capacity or re-grouting
the foundation. The basic principles of curtain grout-
ing design and construction are covered in US Army
Corps of Engineers (1984), Houlsby (1990), Weaver
and Bruce (2007), and Stille (2015).
Remedial grouting of an existing dam is more
complex than grouting the foundation before a dam is
built, mainly because water seepage through the rock
foundation may displace the injected grout. Addition-
ally, the applied grouting pressure may cause
hydraulic jacking or increase the uplift pressure, both
of which can affect dam stability. A remedial grouting
operation has three fundamental stages: exploration
and situation assessment, responsive execution, and
verification and monitoring of performance (Bruce
2007). Examples of remedial rock grouting under
concrete dams have been presented by Bruce et al.
(1998), Bruce and Gillon (2003), Weaver and Bruce
(2007), Bruce (2012), Wilson (2012), and Buckby
et al. (2015).
These previous publications mainly cover the
practical aspects of curtain grouting under dams and
give recommendations for future projects. However,
with the exception of the brief discussion of alarm
levels for high uplift pressure in Buckby et al. (2015),
they scarcely discuss the dam safety aspects that arise
during the actual execution of remedial grouting. As
many dam owners and dam safety authorities world-
wide turn towards risk-informed dam safety activities
(Australian National Committee on Large Dams 2003;
Canadian Dam Association 2007a; Spanish National
Committee on Large Dams 2012; Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission 2014; US Army Corps of
Engineers 2014; Federal Emergency Management
Agency 2015), a practical guideline for how to plan
remedial grouting under concrete dams could be of
great use. For example, US Army Corps of Engineers
(2014) states that ‘‘risks to a dam during the
construction phase must be carefully identified, mon-
itored and mitigated. This is especially true on items
such as […] grouting. A detailed plan must be required
for any work related to these items.’’
This paper discusses the applicability of the obser-
vational method to manage dam safety aspects in
remedial grouting projects for concrete dam founda-
tions. This discussion is based on a case study of the
remedial grouting of rock under a Swedish concrete
dam, the procedure of which showed some striking
similarities to the observational method. In short, the
observational method offers a general framework that
is particularly useful in geotechnical design when the
structural behaviour is difficult to predict and associ-
ated with significant risks. The basic principle is to
allow the design to be modified with predefined
measures if observations of the ground behaviour
indicate that the current design is unsuitable. Accord-
ingly, the design should be adapted to the actual
ground conditions. The aim of this paper is to expand
the applicability of the observational method to
remedial grouting projects of concrete dam founda-
tions; identification of potential for wider use of the
method was highlighted as a key issue in an ICE
symposium (Powderham and Nicholson 1996). There-
fore, the focus of the paper is how the requirements of
the observational method can be satisfied. The case
study is included to illustrate the procedure and does
not attempt to present the state of the art in remedial
grouting.
In this paper, the observational method is used in
accordance with its definition in the current European
code for the design of geotechnical structures:
Eurocode 7 (European Committee for Standardization
2004). A first version of the method was defined by
Peck (1969); two recent papers discussing that version
are Wu (2011) and Serra and Miranda (2013).
Regarding the Eurocode definition, few have dis-
cussed its application in detail, though Spross and
Larsson (2014) and Christiansson et al. (2014) have
studied its application to the grouting of rock tunnels;
Zetterlund et al. (2011) have studied rock mass
characterization for use in conjunction with the
observational method in rock grouting; Stille and
Holmberg (2008, 2010) and Spross et al. (2014b) have
discussed some applications in rock engineering and
the link to probabilistic design; and Pra¨stings et al.
(2014) have studied its application when constructing
a high embankment on sulphide clay.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, the subject dam is described, and the
background is given to why a grouting methodology
with an observational approach was needed. In
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Chapters 3–5, the grouting methodology that was
applied in the real case is compared step-by-step with
the corresponding principles of the observational
method as defined in Eurocode 7 (summarized in
Fig. 1). For each principle, the similarities and differ-
ences between the applied methodology and the
observational method are discussed with a focus on
structural safety considerations. To overcome differ-
ences, improvements are suggested to the applied
methodology. Lastly, the findings are summarized and
a coherent framework is presented to manage risks in
the remedial grouting of concrete dam foundations.
2 Case Background
2.1 Dam Description and Initial Conditions
Remedial grouting has been conducted in the rock
under the concrete spillways of a Swedish hydropower
dam (not identified at the owner’s request). The
spillway section is of a buttress type and consists of
three hollow spillway chutes between four piers. The
spillway section is divided into fourmonoliths (Fig. 2).
The underlying rock consists of fine-grained and
coarse-grained granitewith some pegmatite intrusions.
Rock anchors were installed when the damwas built in
the 1960s (their dimensions and quality are unknown,
owing to lost drawings). In a safety reassessment made
in 2006, the computed safety factor against sliding was
found to be unacceptable, despite the good rock mass
quality (Geological Strength Index = 60–80), because
of the detection of a shallow and persistent horizontal
rock joint extending under three of the monoliths
(Figs. 2, 3, 4).
To improve the sliding stability, drilled and grouted
micropiles were planned for installation. However,
first, to avoid the immediate erosion of the grout when
installing the micropiles, remedial grouting of the
curtain was required to reduce the flow rates. This
would, in itself, also increase the sliding stability by
decreasing the uplift pressure. The stability-enhancing
modifications started in October 2011.
2.2 A Dramatic Event Complicating the Project
On 15 November 2011, a dramatic event caused
serious problems. While drilling hole 1 and 2 in the
first row of boreholes for the remedial grouting (to the
left of and under pier 2 in Fig. 5), the infill of a
fracture,*200 kg of sand, was unexpectedly washed
out from these holes. Later, while drilling hole 5 in the
same row, the flow rate emerging from the new
boreholes increased from 0.5 to 4.7 L/s. This event
was registered an immediate drop in uplift pressure at
piezometer P2, as the leakage improved the drainage
capacity (Fig. 6). The flow was large enough to
completely flood a temporarily installed weir. The
fracture aperture was estimated to be 1–10 cm
Fig. 1 Overview of the observational method as defined in
Eurocode 7. Each principle is discussed and compared to the
case
Fig. 2 Cross section of a spillway monolith seen from the side.
A shallow and persistent horizontal rock joint led to low sliding
stability
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(Fig. 4). Although the uplift pressure dropped, which
increased the safety margin against the sliding of the
dam, the planned grouting had to be redesigned and
extended to seal this new leakage as well, as the
grouted micropiles were yet to be installed.
Despite several attempts with heat cement grout,
the seepage could not be sufficiently reduced
(although the total flow rate did decrease from 4.7 to
1.5 L/s). After grouting a second row of boreholes
(holes 7–11 in Fig. 5) along the curtain, the grouting
was considered completed except for the large local
leakage under pier 2. After additional sealing attempts,
including the drilling and grouting of three more
boreholes (G1–G3), the designer judged that the
current grouting methodology was inadequate. There-
fore, a new and improved grouting methodology had
to be developed.
2.3 Improved Grouting Methodology for Local
Leakage Under Pier 2
The main improvement made in the new methodology
was the drilling of two reliefwells (RW12 andRW34 in
Fig. 5) to reduce the uplift pressure and seepage flow.
This would enable the grouting of a horseshoe-shaped
curtain (boreholes 31, 32, 37, 38, and 51–58 in Figs. 5,
7) beside and downstream of the relief wells to enclose
the leaking area. Thereafter, the two relief wells
(RW12 and RW34) could be sealed. The enclosed
area could then be grouted, as the new horseshoe-
shaped curtain would serve as a barrier for the flow.
In the worst case, three possible consequences of
the grouting works that could induce sliding of the
dam were identified during the design process: exces-
sive hydraulic jacking due to an overly high grout
Fig. 3 Cross section of the spillway section seen from the upstream face of the dam
Fig. 4 Images of the persistent fracture taken in two boreholes (diameter: 76 mm) close to pier 2 with a borehole camera in December
2008. The fracture was found to be partially filled with grout. (The ground surface level differs slightly between the two boreholes)
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pressure, increasing piezometric water pressure in the
foundation, and washout of infill material. Thus, these
aspects had to be monitored throughout the project. A
monitoring program was supplemented with contin-
gency action plans to be put into operation if the
predefined limits of acceptable behaviour for the
monitored parameters were exceeded. In the follow-
ing, the applied grouting methodology and its possible
effects on dam safety in light of the definition of the
observational method in Eurocode 7 are discussed.
3 Observational Method and the Real Case
in Comparison
The observational method in Eurocode 7 (Fig. 1) is
defined by five paragraphs, which are quoted in full in
the following sections. The first introduces the method
and suggests when it is suitable for application:
‘‘When prediction of geotechnical behaviour is
difficult, it can be appropriate to apply the
Fig. 5 Plan view of the boreholes used to seal the leakage under
pier 2 (by RW34). Two relief wells and a surrounding
horseshoe-shaped grout curtain (unfilled black circles) were
required to reduce the flow so that the area enclosed by the
curtain could be grouted to seal the leakage
Geotech Geol Eng (2016) 34:1613–1630 1617
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approach known as ‘the observational method’,
in which the design is reviewed during construc-
tion.’’ (European Committee for Standardization
2004)
Below, the authors examine whether such condi-
tions were present in the studied case and highlight
those features that are of relevance in choosing the
observational method.
3.1 Hydraulic Jacking: TheMain Reason to Apply
the Observational Method
Injecting grout of suitable pressure is of particular
importance when grouting in rock close to the ground
surface. Too lowpressuresmaymean that the grout does
not spread to the required distance; too high pressures
may cause increased seepage and uplift pressure under
the dam by causing undesired permanent deformations
in the rockmass (hydraulic jacking) orwashing out infill
material from the joints. Thus, using an overly high
pressure could initiate sliding failure of the dam.
In principle, jacking behaviour can be interpreted as
disengagement of the asperities that are in contact with
each other caused by the joint being subjected to the grout
pressure. Once the grout pressure exceeds the initial
normal stress on the joint, the joint dilates elastically until
ultimate hydraulic jacking occurs when the bearing
capacity is exceeded (Gotha¨ll and Stille 2009).
As a rough guide, US Army Corps of Engineers
(1984) suggests a maximum allowable grout pressure,
pg,max, of 0.011 MPa/m of rock cover to avoid
hydraulic jacking; however, it also mentions that
higher pressures can be safely used in many cases.
From a theoretical basis, Brantberger et al. (2000)
proposed an equation for pg,max and Stille et al. (2012)















and pg,max is given by
pg;max ¼ Dpg þ pw ð1bÞ
In Eq. (1), pw is the piezometric water pressure; q is
the rock mass density; g is the acceleration due to
gravity; h is the depth to the joint measured from the
ground surface; Dpg is the effective grout pressure
(that exceeds pw); k2 is a parameter describing the
relative area of contact in the joint; and I is the grout
spread. In the case of infinite grout spread, Eq. (1)
implies that the loading from the effective grout
pressure and piezometric water pressure may not
exceed the weight of the overburden, if hydraulic
Fig. 6 Measured piezometric water pressure in piezometers P2
and P3 (locations shown in Fig. 5) around the time of the
washout on November 15, 2011
Fig. 7 Cross section along the line of drains in Fig. 5. Inclined
boreholes were used under the pier to seal the horseshoe-shaped
grout curtain
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jacking is to be avoided. See Rafi (2014) for a more
detailed discussion of Eq. (1).
The complexity of the studied case was mainly
attributable to the possibility of inducing hydraulic
jacking in the identified persistent horizontal rock joint,
along which sliding failure of the dam was feared. At
the grouted area, the joint was subject to an insignif-
icant, possibly non-existent, normal stress owing to its
position at the dam heel. Furthermore, the reservoir
head implied an already high pw in the foundation,
which had to be exceeded by the grout pressure (Eq. 1).
Notably, as the rock cover above the jointwas only 3 m,
the US Army Corps of Engineers (1984) would suggest
a pg,max significantly less than the expected pw.
Although the rigid dam body and old rock anchors
contributed a stabilizing effect, the risk of sliding
failure caused by the effects of hydraulic jacking could
not be disregarded. In addition, the significant ideal-
izations in Eq. (1) meant that whether the equation
was applicable in this complex case was questionable.
3.2 Additional Reasons to Apply
the Observational Method
In addition to the estimation of the allowable pg,max,
the studied case included other difficulties and risks.
Accidental clogging of the drains by grout could also
increase the uplift pressure and thereby affect the
sliding stability. Another risk, which is independent,
however, of the applied grouting procedure, was the
possibility of infill material washing out from the
fracture when drilling boreholes. If the washout were
significant, it could induce local subsidence of the rock
mass, causing increased leakage and reduced shear
capacity against sliding failure.
The detected risks associated with remedial grout-
ing were found to be easier to manage by carefully
observing the behaviour of the foundation. Therefore,
given the site conditions and the complex response of
the rock mass when grouting, the geotechnical
behaviour was considered difficult to predict, making
the observational method a viable option.
4 Preparations During the Design Stage
To apply the observational method properly, there are
five requirements listed in Eurocode 7 that must be
fulfilled in the preliminary design (Fig. 1). This rules
out the common misinterpretation of the observational
method as a design-as-you-go approach (Schubert
2008). Instead, a framework of predefined contingency
actions to put into operation is set up a priori, in case the
geotechnical behaviour turns out to be unacceptable.
Sections 4.1–4.4 of this paper quote and discuss one of
these requirements at a time in relation to the remedial
grouting design that was prepared in the real case.
4.1 Acceptable Limits of Behaviour
Eurocode 7 (European Committee for Standardization
2004) states the following:
‘‘The following requirements shall be met before
construction is started:
– acceptable limits of behaviour shall be estab-
lished.’’
To reasonably document that dam safety was
acceptable throughout the project, three control
parameters were chosen for remedial grouting: uplift
pressure, vertical displacement, and visual detection
of infill material being washed out of boreholes. The
choice of control parameters is an important aspect of
the observational method. According to Spross (2014),
suitable control parameters should
• make it possible to establish a limit of behaviour
that is linked to a predicted behaviour of the
structure,
• be measurable with acceptable precision, and
• be of epistemic nature (as discussed by Stille and
Holmberg 2010), which implies that the related
uncertainty is because of a lack of knowledge
rather than because of intrinsic randomness of a
phenomenon (see e.g. Der Kiureghian and Ditle-
vsen 2009; Baecher 2016). Having epistemic
uncertainties, the measurements in the construc-
tion stage will decrease the uncertainties of the
assumptions made in the design stage.
The chosen control parameters satisfied these
criteria: they were related to the sliding failure of the
dam, were believed to be measurable (or observable)
precisely enough to support any decision to use
contingency actions, and the measurements would
decrease the uncertainties of the prior assumptions. An
Geotech Geol Eng (2016) 34:1613–1630 1619
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example of a prior assumption is the commonly
assumed bilinear uplift pressure distribution, used in,
for example, Swedenergy (2012) and Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (2002), which are Swedish
and American guidelines for dam safety, respectively.
The choices of the control parameters were straight-
forward because they could be monitored using fairly
simple instruments.
Limits of acceptable behaviour (alarm thresholds)
that were linked to the control parameters were
established. The maximum average piezometric water
pressure allowable in the rock joint downstream of the
drains, ujoint;lim, was set to 56 kPa (Fig. 8). This limit
corresponded directly to an average piezometer read-
ing, upiez;lim, of 70 kPa (the piezometers were posi-
tioned below the rock joint).
For hydraulic jacking, a maximum allowable uplift
displacement, dlim, of 0.2 mm was established in
accordance to the rule of thumb long used by the
Swedish State Power Board (Statens Vattenfallsverk
1968). The limit for observed infilling material was set
to ‘‘visible washout.’’ The established limits were
based on the maximum values that, at the time, were
believed to maintain an adequate factor of safety. In
the following, the defined limits are discussed with
respect to their impact on dam safety.
4.1.1 Discussion of the Acceptable Limit for Average
Uplift Pressure
In this case, the uplift pressure had a significant
influence on the calculated safety factor against sliding
failure. In Table 1, safety factors are shown for
various assumed ujoint values in the range of previously
measured pressures (Fig. 6). The safety factors were
calculated assuming an uplift pressure distribution
shaped as in Fig. 8 and, for the rest, in accordance to
the Swedish dam safety guidelines (Swedenergy
2012). The stability assessment conservatively
excluded the resistance provided by the old rock
anchors owing to their unknown condition. Table 1
shows that both the initial conditions and the ujoint;lim
value corresponded to very small calculated safety
factors that were significantly less than 1.35, which is
the safety factor recommended by Swedenergy (2012)
for a usual load case. In fact, even a moderate uplift
pressure increase could have reduced the safety factor
below 1. Therefore, the following presents an
improved approach that keeps the risk for sliding
failure at an acceptable level in case of a sudden
increase in piezometric water pressure while execut-
ing grouting.
In the general case, an increased ujoint value can be
directly linked to a change in the calculated probabil-
ity of failure. For example, a dam owner can choose to
accept the risk associated with subjecting the dam to
an additional uplift pressure so that the probability of
sliding failure increases by Dpf ;acc. In deterministic
terms, this may correspond to decreasing the safety
factor from the initial SFinit to the smallest accept-
able safety factor, SFacc (Fig. 9a). For infrequent
(exceptional) load cases, such as temporary loads
Fig. 8 Cross section of spillway monolith 2 showing the
initially measured average uplift pressure, ujoint , downstream of
the drains in comparison to the maximum allowable uplift
pressure, ujoint;lim. The joint orientation is clear from Fig. 3
Table 1 The effect of ujoint on the calculated safety factor
against sliding failure
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during construction work, the Swedish guidelines
(Swedenergy 2012) require SFexc = 1.1. For refer-
ence, the Canadian Dam Association (2007b) and the
US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (2002)
require SFexc = 1.3 for similar load cases. Executing
remedial grouting implies loads that are arguably
transient; designing for safety factors of exceptional
load cases can therefore be acceptable for actual
grouting works. However, if the elapsed time from
discovering a need for stability improvement to
completing the stability enhancement is significant,
the dam owner may need to meet the requirement for
usual load cases, e.g., SFusual[ 1.5 (Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission 2002), because the loads are
no longer transient.
As the safety factor may not decrease below SFacc,
executing remedial grouting under a dam with
SFinit[ SFacc is acceptable only if the additional
loads from grouting are small enough to continuously
keep SF[ SFacc. The limit of acceptable behaviour
must, therefore, be established such that the lead time
allows for contingency actions to be put into operation
before SFacc is reached (Fig. 9a) (Pate´-Cornell and
Benito-Claudio 1987, Olsson and Stille 2002).
For some dams, like the studied dam with
SFinit = 1.06, the relationship SFinit\ SFacc may
hold. A dam owner willing to accept the same increase
in failure probability, Dpf ;acc, during the grouting
works, regardless of the initial safety calculation,
consequently accepts additional loads until SFDpf is
reached (Fig. 9b). However, the margin between SFinit
and SFDpf may not always provide the required safety
margin to allow for the lead time and a range of
acceptable behaviour. An additional margin can then
be created by reducing the driving loads on the dam,
until a safety factor SFred,load is reached. Some options
are to perform grouting during the summer to avoid ice
loads, to install rock anchors, or to lower the reservoir
level temporarily. However, as discussed above, the
dam must not be subjected to a very low value of SF
for long periods. Therefore, waiting for several months
before conducting grouting works, for example, to
avoid ice loads, becomes questionable.
Even if SF\ SFacc during project execution, the
suggested approach conforms to Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (2002), which notes that the
required safety factor should reflect the degree of
uncertainty in the safety assessment. This is visualized
by the truncated probability distribution in Fig. 9b; the
dam is stable for SF[ SFinit, and it can only fail if it is
subjected to loads larger than any previously experi-
enced load. Therefore, the limits of acceptable be-
haviour may correspond to a safety factor less than
SFacc.
In practice, the assessment of Dpf ;acc and SFDpf can
be troublesome for dams with very low SFinit.
However, considering the significant probability den-
sity causing failure adjacent to the SFinit in Fig. 9b,
Dpf ;acc implies only a limited acceptable decrease
from SFinit. Consequently, SFDpf may, for practical
convenience and for a conservative solution, be
approximated with SFinit.
To illustrate this concept, a limit of acceptable be-
haviour and the corresponding lead time is presented
for the studied dam. Given the fact that SFinit = 1.06 is
already low, no additional decrease in safety is
allowable in practice. The current loads must, there-
fore, be decreased to create a safety margin until a
Fig. 9 Probability distribution indicating the structural relia-
bility in relation to calculated SF (assuming that 50 % of all
dams would fail if their SFs were decreased to 1). The required
lead time and limit of acceptable behavior in relation to SFinit are
indicated. In a SFinit[ SFacc, and in b SFinit\ SFacc
Geotech Geol Eng (2016) 34:1613–1630 1621
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satisfactory SFred,load is reached. The required lead
time for the contingency action (increasing the
drainage capacity in case it is insufficient) is estimated
to be 15 min, given that the drill rig is on standby. The
rate of increase of the piezometric pressure is assumed
to be 100 kPa/h at the piezometers, until arriving at the
linear pressure distribution normally assumed for
dams without drains. For the same range of accept-
able uplift pressure as before (less than the limit of
acceptable behaviour ujoint;lim), the average maximum
uplift pressure in the joint as measured by the
piezometers becomes ujoint;lim ? 25 kPa. This corre-
sponds to a piezometric pressure at the drains, udrains,
of 90 kPa (Fig. 8). To keep the risk level constant, this
requires a drawdown of the reservoir level by at least
1.5 m (Table 2). Assuming that the drawdown does
not affect the initial uplift pressure (Fig. 6), SFred,load
would be 1.21 when the grouting work begins. If
ujoint;lim is reached, SF = 1.15 for a reduced reservoir
level.
Unfortunately, this safety margin was not clearly
analysed and established in the actual execution of the
grouting works. Notably, an increase in piezometric
pressure at the drains to 90 kPa without decreasing
any other load would have implied SF of 0.93,
excluding the resistance provided by the old rock
anchors.
4.1.2 Discussion of the Maximum
Acceptable Deformation
For hydraulic jacking, the major issue was not the
vertical displacement in itself but, rather, the possible
consequences of a widened fracture: a significantly
increased flow rate and subsequently, increased uplift
pressure. Thus, a case of elastic jacking, which retracts
once the grouting pressure subsides, was, at the time,
considered unproblematic for the structural safety of
the dam. The major risk was considered to be the
consequences of ultimate (irreversible) jacking. How-
ever, a dilation of the grouted fracture may open up or
close nearby fractures (Fransson et al. 2010). In Rafi
and Stille (2015a), it was shown theoretically that this
significantly could increase the transmissivity of the
rock joint immediately outside the grouted area; in
Rafi and Stille (2015b), this aspect was discussed in
the light of three case studies. When a high-quality
grout curtain with minimum leakage is desired,
hydraulic jacking should be avoided completely.
Consequently, a precision issue is introduced; such
small deformations may be very difficult to detect as
other rock joints nearby might, at least partially,
absorb the deformation. Recently, Lin et al. (2016)
presented a case study of a foundation grouting under
an arch dam, where uplift deformation measurements
with a 10-lm precision were used to adjust the
pressure and injection rate of the grout.
In retrospect, the choice of measurement equipment
for monitoring hydraulic jacking is highlighted as a
crucial aspect. Another method to detect hydraulic
jacking that could be used as a complement is to
continuously monitor, for example, flows, pressures,
and apparent Lugeon values; owing to the increased
use of computer monitoring in the grouting industry in
the past decade, such approaches have improved
rapidly (Wilson 2012; Bruce 2012). Wilson (2012)
gives examples of application of apparent Lugeon
theory; two other grouting approaches based on
monitoring are the Aperture Control Grouting
approach (Bonin et al. 2012; Carter et al. 2012) and
the Real Time Grouting Control method (Rafi and
Stille 2014).
Striving to avoid hydraulic jacking sets high
demands on grouting. Low grout pressure is required;
nonetheless, the piezometric water pressure at the
point where grout is being injected must be overcome






for constant risk level
SF after
drawdowna
Constant uplift pressure 50 1.06 0 1.06
Large uplift pressure increase 90 0.93 -1.5 1.21
a Swedenergy (2012) was used to assess the loads in calculating the safety factors
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to enable grouting to be performed. The compromise
of these two aspects gives the best possible solution
given the circumstances: grout pressure that barely
exceeds the piezometric water pressure to minimize
Dpg and the probability of causing hydraulic jacking.
Doing so reduces the risk of inducing significantly
increased uplift pressure.
4.2 Design for Actual Behaviour Within
the Acceptable Limits
The second Eurocode requirement states that the
designer must show that the preliminary design has an
acceptable probability of enabling successful con-
struction, thus limiting the need for contingency
actions (European Committee for Standardization
2004):
– ‘‘the range of possible behaviour shall be assessed
and it shall be shown that there is an accept-
able probability that the actual behaviour will be
within the acceptable limits.’’
For uplift pressure, the range of possible behaviour
was assessed to be within full headwater and full
tailwater pressure, because of the unknown subsurface
drainage conditions. The margin to ujoint;lim = 56 kPa
(i.e.,upiez;lim = 70 kPa) was judged to be large enough
to assume that exceeding the piezometric pressure
limit was sufficiently unlikely, as the piezometers
indicated pressures in the range of 30–50 kPa before
grouting started.
By setting dlim to a displacement (0.2 mm) that was
judged small, the range of elastic displacement was
believed to provide a safety margin against ultimate
hydraulic jacking (although it was noted that this
margin was very difficult to quantify). Notably, as
grouting could easily be stopped the moment any
displacement was recorded, to let the displacement
retract, a rather high probability could be accepted for
exceeding dlim.
The possibility of causing yet another washout of
infill material was considered significant, as this had
already happened once. Although a subsequent flow
rate increase would imply even more difficulties in
grouting being completed successfully, the event is not
dangerous unless the drainage capacity is exceeded.
Notably, the probabilities of exceeding the accept-
able limits were not calculated numerically; instead,
they were assessed subjectively to be sufficiently
unlikely. Whether this approach is acceptable is
discussed in the following.
4.2.1 Discussion of the Subjective Probability
Judgments
Had the observational method been applied formally,
not establishing the probability of exceeding the
acceptable limits is a deviation from the Eurocode
principles. However, Spross and Larsson (2014) argue
that this deviation should occasionally be acceptable,
because the effect on the project is only that the need
for contingency actions remains unknown (assuming
that the project can manage a significant increase in
contingency actions). Thus, if the contingency actions
must be implemented more often than expected, this
could delay the project significantly and increase the
total cost. Not fulfilling this Eurocode principle makes
it difficult to find a more favourable design, thereby
losing some optimization potential. However, the
safety of the structure is not threatened as long as the
contingency actions may be put into operation more
frequently than originally planned.
In the studied case, it would have been very difficult
to objectively assess the probabilities of exceeding the
acceptable limits owing to the nature of the problem.
In addition, given the relatively economic and simple
contingency actions that were prepared for the case of
an exceeded limit (see Sect. 4.4), it is rather unrea-
sonable to say that the inability to fulfil this particular
Eurocode requirement should stop the project. To
some degree, the cost was subordinate to the impor-
tance of improving the safety of the dam. This
situation is different from a case in which the
observational method is only one of several options
and a more favourable method is to be chosen. A
numerical assessment of the probabilities of exceeding
the limits would then provide crucial information
about possible cost increases and time delays. How-
ever, when comparing the Eurocode version of the
observational method with Peck’s definition, it
becomes evident that such a strict interpretation was
never the originator’s intention: ‘‘The degree to which
all these steps can be followed depends on the nature
and complexity of the work’’ (Peck 1969). For
example, this interpretation could imply assessing
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the probability of exceeding the acceptable limits only
subjectively, in a manner similar to the studied case.
For a practical solution, the authors argue that if the
execution of the project depends on whether this
Eurocode requirement can be fulfilled, a less strict
interpretation should be acceptable. However, in such
cases, the design engineer must be aware that a less
rigorous analysis implies larger uncertainties regard-
ing the final cost.
4.3 On the Monitoring Plan
The third and fourth requirements state the following
(European Committee for Standardization 2004):
– ‘‘a plan of monitoring shall be devised, which will
reveal whether the actual behaviour lies within the
acceptable limits. The monitoring shall make this
clear at a sufficiently early stage, and with
sufficiently short intervals to allow contingency
actions to be undertaken successfully.’’
– ‘‘the response time of the instruments and the
procedures for analysing the results shall be
sufficiently rapid in relation to the possible evo-
lution of the system.’’
The grouting instructions in the studied case
included a monitoring plan. The piezometric water
pressure was to be monitored using six piezometers
(Fig. 5). They were to be continuously checked in an
automatic system both during grouting and until at
least 4 h after grouting was finished or until the
piezometric pressures had stabilized. The vertical
displacement was to be continuously monitored during
grouting at two places using extensometers (Figs. 5,
10). The staff at the site was to be observant of any
signs of a washout occurring.
If the behaviour were found unacceptable during or
after the grouting, contingency actions (see below)
were prepared to immediately be put into operation.
The continuous reading of the instruments and the
very straightforward analysis of the measurement data
were believed to make the time between exceeding the
limit and taking action acceptably short. In addition, as
upiez;lim was defined as the average given by the four
piezometers penetrating the persistent fracture,
exceeding this limit in only one piezometer allowed
for contingency measures to reduce the pressure
before it had spread too far. However, a case of
sudden uplift pressure increase under the whole
monolith would have been very difficult to handle.
Such a situation was, on the other hand, considered
very unlikely as this would require the leakage to
increase so much that it exceeded the total drainage
capacity.
One objective of a monitoring plan is to gather
information that establishes whether the current
design is sufficient or needs to be changed. In this
case, fairly simple devices and methods were used and
little data analysis was needed; this limited the
likelihood of both misinterpreting the results and
communication delays. In that sense, the two Euro-
code requirements were fulfilled. However, this con-
clusion presumes that the sensors covered the relevant
area, were correctly installed, and fully functional
during the work. For example, Hanna et al. (1993)
reported that uplift pressures for a given dam can be
highly variable, depending on local irregularities in
the foundation. Moreover, Nicholson et al. (1999)
Fig. 10 One of the extensometers used to measure vertical
displacement. Image by authors
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recommend that a monitoring system should have two
levels of entry, one primary and one secondary, where
the latter serves as a backup system to check the
performance of the former. Although only one type of
measurement equipment was used for each monitored
parameter in the studied case, the fact that several
devices were installed provided at least some redun-
dancy to the monitoring plan. As a result, a malfunc-
tioning instrument could have been detected more
easily.
4.4 On the Contingency Action Plan
The last Eurocode requirement states the following
(European Committee for Standardization 2004):
– ‘‘a plan of contingency actions shall be devised,
which may be adopted if the monitoring reveals
behaviour outside acceptable limits.’’
Contingency actions were prepared to manage the
three identified risks: exceptionally increased uplift
pressure, hydraulic jacking, and washout of infilling
material while drilling.
• If ujoint;lim were exceeded, equipment was ready to
either open up boreholes (that had been temporar-
ily sealed in advance to prevent grout from
escaping) or quickly drill additional relief wells.
• If hydraulic jacking occurred owing to an overly
large grouting pressure, the grouting pressure was
to be reduced immediately until the displacement
fell below dlim again. If hydraulic jacking occurred
owing to an overly large piezometric water
pressure, measures were to be taken to reduce this
pressure in the same manner as if upiez;lim was
exceeded.
• If a visible amount of infilling material was washed
out from any borehole, drilling was to be stopped
immediately. To avoid any additional washout, the
rock mass around the washout was then to be
grouted to stabilize the loose material before
drilling continued.
These actions were robust for both the dam stability
and the hydraulic jacking case, and they could be put
into operation quickly.
5 The Execution Stage
Once the monitoring and contingency action plans are
prepared, the execution of the project can begin. The
Eurocode states the following (European Committee
for Standardization 2004):
‘‘During construction, the monitoring shall be
carried out as planned.’’
‘‘The results of the monitoring shall be assessed
at appropriate stages and the planned contin-
gency actions shall be put into operation if the
limits of behaviour are exceeded.’’
‘‘Monitoring equipment shall either be replaced
or extended if it fails to supply reliable data of
appropriate type or in sufficient quantity.’’
In the following, these requirements are discussed
in relation to the actual execution of the project. The
procedure outlined in Sects. 4.1–4.4 was generally
followed, and the leakage could finally be sealed. The
boreholes were injected with a stable grout mix of
Cementa Injektering 30 (for which 95 % of the cement
particles are smaller than 30 lm) with 2 % addition of
SetControl II (a high-performance setting time regu-
lator and dispersion additive based on sulphonated
naphthalene polymers and nitrate). Grout properties
were tested for the w/c ratio of 0.8 (Table 3). Injected
boreholes and amounts of grout injected in each round
are presented in detail in Table 4 and Figs. 5 and 7. In
Table 3 Results of pretesting of grout properties for the w/c
ratio of 0.8 at the beginning of the remedial grouting project
Grout property Method Average value
Density Mud balancea 1.60 g/cm3
Marsh funnel time Marsh funnelb 32.8 s
Bleed Cylinderc 1.5 %
Penetrability Filter pumpd 280 ml
a 2 separate batches with 3 measurements from each
b 3 measurements from 1 batch; 1 litre used for each
measurement; tested in accordance to Eriksson and Stille
(2005)
c 2 separate batches with 3 measurements from each; tested in
accordance to SS 137540 (Swedish Standards Institute 2008)
d 2 separate batches with 3 measurements from each; 75 lm
filter; tested in accordance to SS-EN 14497 (Swedish Standards
Institute 2004)
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the first three rounds, 1079 kg of cement grout was
injected in total. Lugeon tests were performed before
and in between the rounds to measure the hydraulic
conductivity of the rock mass (Table 5). The Lugeon
tests performed after two rounds (April 15, 2012)
indicated that the fracture had been sealed on both
sides of the pier, but that there still was a leakage
remaining under it. This was addressed in the subse-
quent rounds. In the fourth round, a thinner grout was
used to penetrate the narrower fractures better than the
thicker grout had done in previous rounds. During the
fourth round, it was noted that cement grout emerged
from relief well RW34. Although the risk of erosion of
grout would increase because of the increased gradi-
ent, a packer was used to partly seal the relief well to
prevent the grout from escaping. In the fifth round,
borehole 69 was newly drilled and then grouted along
with borehole 65.
After these five rounds of grouting, a grout curtain
enclosing relief well 34 had been created. The
watertightness of the grout curtain was tested on
May 7, 2012, by sealing the relief well and monitoring
the piezometric pressure changes under the monolith
(Fig. 11). The piezometric pressure in RW34
increased to 160 kPa. Piezometer P3 registered a
considerable increase from 30 to 103 kPa, whereas
piezometer P11 showed a lesser increase from 36 to
49 kPa. The other piezometers in the vicinity regis-
tered fairly constant or decreasing pressures. Neither
extensometer registered any displacement. Although
the measurement in P3 locally exceeded 70 kPa, no
contingency action was put into operation as the
average for the monolith remained below the limit of
acceptable behaviour, upiez;lim.
The piezometric pressure increase in P3 indicated
that the grout curtain leaked there. However, the
leakage was judged small, as the surrounding
piezometers did not indicate any pressure increase;
therefore, the enclosed area around the relief well was
grouted next. This was judged the most critical part of
the project in terms of risk for hydraulic jacking owing
to the required grout pressure of 250 kPa to overcome
the high water pressure. However, the new horseshoe-
shaped grout curtain (Fig. 5) was assumed to serve as a
hydraulic barrier, thereby limiting the pressurized
area.
During grouting (round 6 in Table 4), the exten-
someters did not register any movements (in fact, they
did not register any movement at all throughout the
whole project). Instead, the piezometric pressure in P3
decreased from 62 to 37 kPa and the other adjacent
piezometers registered constant, low pressures. Fur-
thermore, as no leakage could be observed visually on
the rock surface, the grout curtain was considered
completed. A comparison of the situation before and
after the grouting shows that the piezometric pressure
at P3 had been reduced significantly from 48 to 27 kPa
(Fig. 12).
To summarize the execution of the project, mon-
itoring was performed continuously according to the
plan. No contingency action was needed. The prelim-
inary design proved successful and the limits of
acceptable behaviour were not exceeded, although
locally, at one piezometer, the pressure increased
significantly. The monitoring equipment provided
reliable data of sufficient quality to base decisions on
during the execution of the project, although comple-
menting the extensometers with computer monitoring
Table 4 Overview of the executed remedial grouting to seal the local leakage under pier 2 in April and May, 2012
Round (date) Injected boreholes (Figs. 5, 7) W/c ratio Grout injected (kg)
1 (2 April) 53–58 0.55 639
2 (11 April) 31, 32, 37, 38, 51, 52, 53, 55, 58 0.55 or 0.6b 209
3 (16 April) 32, 52, 53, 61, 63–68 0.55 231
4 (26 April) 63–65 0.6 or 0.8b 244
5 (4 May) 65, 69 0.8 109
6 (9 May) 5, RW12a, RW34a, G2, G4 0.8 1322
a Relief wells
b Different thicknesses used in different boreholes
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of for example grout flows and volumes would have
provided even better information about whether and
when hydraulic jacking occurred.
6 Concluding Remarks on Safety Aspects
The applied procedure for the remedial grouting of a
dam foundation was compared to the risk management
framework of the observational method in Eurocode 7.
The results showed that the applied procedure mainly
agreed with the principles of the observational
method. However, some striking inadequacies and
interpretation issues were found. They concerned the
safety margin that is required to undertake contin-
gency actions successfully and how to assess the
probability of exceeding the limit of acceptable be-
haviour. To address the safety aspects, alternative
solutions and interpretations that do not violate
Eurocode 7 were suggested and discussed thoroughly.
To summarize the lessons learned, the dam owner
must carefully consider the case at hand when
designing remedial grouting for dams with very low
safety margins. For example, the expected additional
loads during grouting may require a corresponding
reduction of other driving loads to allow contingency
actions to be put into operation without violating dam
stability. Toward this end, two options are to lower the
reservoir level temporarily and to execute grouting
work when the reservoir is ice-free. To avoid inducing
a piezometric water pressure increase from the
hydraulic jacking of rock joints, the application of
new grouting and related measurement techniques can
be useful in determining an appropriate grouting
pressure. Limiting the pressure improves the sealing
Table 5 Results of performed Lugeon tests in April 2012
before and in between the first three rounds of grouting under
pier 2
Boreholea Lugeon value (L/min m MPa)
1 April 11 April 15 April
12 48.3 54.5 19.3
31 64.0 72.3 0
32 63.6 70.9 10.4
34 59.4 73.7 –
37 38.3 9.7 0
38 37.9 14.5 0
51 48.0 152.7 0
52 47.4 53.4 16.7
53 48.0 51.1 34.3
56 38.4 0 0
57 38.9 0 0
58 36.9 0 0
61 – – 27.8
63 – – 52.0
64 – – 50.2
65 – – 40.2
66 – – 0.7
67 – – 29.1
68 – – 29.2
a Borehole numbers refer to Figs. 5 and 7































Fig. 11 Registered pressure changes in piezometers under the
monolith during the test of the grout curtain on May 7, 2012
Fig. 12 Registered pressure changes in piezometers P2 and P3
throughout the project. Note the pressure drop in P2 caused by
the washout on November 15. The spikes from March to May
are caused by grouting activities and tests of the hydraulic
conductivity. The last activity took place on May 9
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efficiency and, thereby, the sliding stability of the
dam.
Satisfying the observational method in accordance
to the suggestions of this paper offers a coherent
methodology to manage the safety aspects in the
remedial grouting of a concrete dam foundation under
which shallow, persistent, horizontal rock joints are
present. In conclusion, the authors’ recommendations
for engineers involved in this type of remedial
grouting projects are to consider the observational
method as defined in Eurocode 7 and refer to
Chapters 4–5 of this paper for suggestions on how
the Eurocode requirements can be satisfied. This
methodology is in line with the risk-informed dam
safety policies and procedures currently being devel-
oped worldwide.
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